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Chapter 1
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING ISSUES
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, new directions have begun to emerge in
agricultural export marketing. Emphasis has been placed on managed
marketing to target market segments, rather than on bulk commodity
trading. This has resulted in an increasing focus on product and
market development and concern exists as to whether the marketing
structures which now exist most appropriately meet perceived
industry needs in these areas. In addition, there is a greater
awareness by Government that the granting of statutory rights to a
sector of an industry involves a redistribution of property rights,
which has both efficiency and equity implications.
In New Zealand, a variety of marketing arrangements have
emerged to cope with the export marketing of New Zealand's primary
products. At one end of the spectrum is a controlled marketing
structure typified by the dairying industry which has essentially
existed in this form for over fifty years. At a lesser level of
regulation are the statutory boards which trade alongside existing
marketing channels when they feel it is necessary. These include the
wool industry and the meat industry prior to 1983. Other statutory
options which partially regulate marketing activity are also in
operation. An example would be a restriction on the number of
private exporters who are licensed by an industry authority, as with
kiwifruit.
2In addition to this wide variation in statutory marketing
alternatives, there exist a number of unregulated structures. For
example, in the barley industry, a voluntary producer cooperative
operates alongside private exporting merchants. On the other hand,
in newly-emerging export industries such as cut flowers, there is
no collective organisation of marketing activity by producers as a
group, and a variety of export arrangements appear to exist between
individual producers and their agents.
Two broad issues emerge with respect to the range of marketing
alternatives which are in operation. The first has a positive
orientation, and addresses the questions of why alternative market-
ing structures evolve in different industries, and why different
structures may emerge in the same industry at different periods in
time. The second issue is of a more normative nature, and concerns
the evaluation of these alternative marketing structures with
respect to their performance. To some extent, the two issues are
interrelated, since it may prove necessary to understand why
structures have evolved in a certain way in order to evaluate
factors influencing their performance. These two issues will now
be discussed briefly.
1.2 The Evolution of Marketing Channels
From a cursory examination of the historical evolution of
alternative marketing structures in New Zealand, it is not clear why
different structures have emerged in different industries, despite a
perceived stimulus to change which appears to be similar in a number
of cases. For example, some industries such as dairying and pipfruit
adopted highly regulated marketing structures in response to low
prices in the 1920's, and several statutory boards were established
in the United Kingdom in the depressed 1930's to provide farm income
3relief. However, during the same period, other industries in New
Zealand such as wool, which were initially regulated in response
to perceived low prices, reverted to private enterprise marketing
after international wool stockpiles had been cleared. In more recent
years, the kiwifruit industry inst ituted licensing of exporter s.
This move was partially in response to a perceived threat of over-
supply and hence lower threatened producer prices in the future,
but also related to a perceived lack of coordination of the pricing
and distribution activities of exporters. On the other hand, barley
producers responded to what appeared to be a similar stimulus on
the surface (that is, perceived low prices) by forming a voluntary
marketing cooperative which trades alongside existing channels.
What appears to emerge from the above discussion is that the
stimulus of actual, perceived or threatened low or uncertain prices
may lead to some change in existing marketing arrangements in an
industry. However, the reasons why different structures may then
emerge appears to be more firmly embedded in the politics and
economics of the situation.
For example, perceived low prices in the kiwifruit industry
were seen to arise from an oversupply of product, particularly of
poorer quality fruit. Therefore, it was felt that greater industry-
wide coordination of exports was necessary to arrest this threatened
price decline. In the barley industry, on the other hand, growers
perceived an inadequate link between the relatively low prices which
they received from merchants and the higher world price for barley.
This led to the formation of a producer cooperative, which can be
envisaged as having the dual effect of providing growers with an
alternative marketing channel, and of allowing them to use this
new channel as a means of exercising countervailing power against
existing merchants. In industries which were even less coordinated,
price uncertainty resulted in changes in marketing options. For
example, exporters of linseed initially offered growers a forward
4contract to induce them to produce a crop which was unfamiliar to
them. However, when they were not able to realize these forward
prices, they withdrew from further contracts of this nature, and
operated as commission agents on behalf of growers.
Therefore, while low or uncertain actual or perceived prices
may be a catalyst for a change in marketing options, the form which
such change might take is likely to vary according to the political
and commercial/economic environment of the industry. In order to
understand how marketing channels might emerge, it would seem to be
necessary to focus on both the political and economic linkages which
are established among the producers, other individuals and the
organisations who together constitute the marketing system.
1.3 An Evaluation of Marketing Channel Performance
In addition to the positive question of why alternative
channels arise or co-exist, the normative issue of whether these
channels meet specified performance criteria is also of importance.
In general, such performance criteria are based on broad efficiency
concepts, such as whether existing resources are efficiently
alloca ted, whether marketing func tions are performed at minimum
cost, and whether alternative channels have the ability to capture
market opportunities and to adapt to changes in them.
In some cases, these issues of efficiency may manifest them-
selves in terms of more specifically perceived problems. These could
include issues such as "weak selling" behaviour, a lack of marketing
and promotional activity, insufficient innovation, unclear price
signals and an inability to monitor the performance of alternative
channels.
5When evaluating these efficiency issues, attention would have
to be paid to indicators such as channel contestability, (either
directly or at arms length, as suggested by barriers to entry
or inhibitions to channel selection), the level and volatility
of sales, prices and profits, innovation indices, production
and marketing costs including those of entering and completing
transactions, productivity ratios and market shares. If any
such evaluation of marketing channel performance indicated that
efficiency criteria were not being met, then Government may have a
role to play in rectifying this situation. Any such role would
depend on the source of the inefficiencies. For example, if it
is difficult for existing or potential entrants to assess the
performance of alternative channels, then Government may be able
to assist by providing relevant information. Alternatively, if
regulatory barriers to channel entry exist, or situations of
conflict cannot be resolved internally, and inefficiencies are seen
to arise from these, then it may be appropriate for Government to
remove such impediment s. Consequently, t he perceived sources of
channel inefficiency would be important when determining any
appropriate Government response.
1.4 Alternative Theoretical Frameworks
The agricultural economics literature has explored to a limited
extent the positive issue of why channels evolve. Such research
includes the reasons for the emergence of producer cooperatives, the
causes of integration, and the rationale for statutory intervention
in its varying forms. By and large, however, this research has not
attempted to explain why different degrees of regulation appear to
emerge in different industries, nor has it addressed changes in
uncoordinated and unregulated options.
6Normative issues of efficiency in agricultural marketing
channels have also been addressed using the traditional tools of
economic analysis. The major thrust of this "economic" approach,
which utilises industry organisat ion theory, includes the conse-
quences of economic power within imperfectly-competitive channels,
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, measurement of marketing
margins and their behaviour over time as quantities sold and
channel structure undergo change, technical and economic efficiency
with which marketing functions are performed, the efficiency of
information and pricing systems and the effects of integration
within the channel.
This traditional approach to agricultural market channel
analysis, however, does not incorporate insight s which may arise
from more recent development in economic theory, nor does it include
some approaches emanating from the marketing literature. For
example, less well utilised economic concepts include the "new"
theories related to non-zero adjustment and transaction costs,
contestability theory, contrac t and agency theory, recognition of
externalities due to market failure in competitive channels, the
implica tions of emerging organisation forms, and the creation of
competition in administered (public or private) marketing channels.
A review of the recent marketing literature in relation to
distribution channel issues reveals a heavy emphasis on behavioural/
sociopolitical relationships, especially those among power and its
sources, intra-channel conflict, satisf action and performance. In
general, the approach is oriented to micro-managerial issues such
as how a firm should use its power and how to design influence
strategies without deleterious effects on conflict and performance,
and the design of conflict management strategies. Less common
are macro issues such as the consequences of a change in existing
structures, or power balances among firms within the channel. Nor
has the linkage between the behavioural issues of power and conflict
7with the economic variables characterising performance been well-
established.
The microeconomic (neoclassical) paradigm, with its central
belief that competition brings about allocative efficiency, provides
the foundation for much of the economist's theory building and
hypothesis testing in relation to the workings of marketing systems.
Further, the approaches of the marketing profession with their
concentration on power and conflict can be viewed as in the spirit
of the marketing management tradition (itself rooted to the micro-
economic paradigm) with its emphasis on determination of "best"
strategies for individual firms.
In addition to the possibility of integrating both the
economics and marketing approaches to the analysis of marketing
systems, another recent view is that such analyses need to be
extended beyond the constructs of microeconomics. If the objective
is to explain and prescribe changes to marketing structures, a model
designed essentially to assist individuals will be inadequate, and
extensions to encompass constructs from political science, sociology
and organisation theory may be required.
Such a paradigm '·JQuld therefore encompass a wider political
economy world view than does the narrow microeconomic focus.
However, economic theory can provide some of -the normative
prescriptions for behaviour which often appear to be lacking in
marketing research.
81.5 Research Objective
The objective of this paper is to present a theoretical frame-
work for analysing marketing channel issues which incorporates
insights from recent economic theory and from marketing paradigms.
The research issues which this analytical framework addresses are of
both a positive and a normative nature. Positive questions include
why alternative marketing channels emerge, while normative issues
focus on the evaluation of these alternative marketing structures
with respect to their performance.
In Section 2, developments in market channel analysis from the
marketing literature are summarised, while in Section 3, recent
advances in economic theory are evaluated with respect to their
ability to analyse some of these marketing channel issues. Finally,
in Section 4, an attempt is made to integrate some of the insights
from both these strands of literature, thereby allowing a wider
analytical perspective to be taken on the marketing channel issues
which have been identified.
* * * * *
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MARKETING CHANNELS
2.1 Introduction
Not until the early 1980's did the published work of marketing
scholars on distribution channels comprehensively tackle the need
to develop a comprehensive framework for analysis. This framework,
which suggests the integration of the political, economic, social
and behavioural components of marketing channels, has been referred
to as the political economy model.
This approach views the marketing channel as a social system,
as well as an economic system, comprising social units (e.g.
firms, groups) who interact through exchange processes, and whose
individual and collective behaviour is the result of both economic
and socio-political forces.
A point of exchange between any pair of such agents will be
termed a dyad, and is the unit of analysis in the political economy
approach. Such an exchange could involve two independently-owned
firms, a firm and a regulatory agent, or two profit-centres within a
vertically-integrated corporate channel. The framework applies to
any such dyads. Exploration of the behaviour and performance of the
channel system as a whole will then require analysis of all such
interactions among the participants who comprise the channel system.
The general term "contractual arrangements" is used in later
sections to describe the nature of such interactions.
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The political economy framework can be viewed as two major sub-
systems, the internal and external political economies. The first
of these comprises the structuring and functioning of the distribu-
tion channel, i.e. the setting in which the institutions that make
up the channel interact and pursue their own and collective goals,
while the second comprises the channel's environment.
2.2 The Internal Political Economy
Figure 1 gives the major concepts within the internal system.
This suggests that marketing channel analyses should consider both
the "economy" and "polity" issues, along with their interactions.
Each in turn can be analysed with respect to structures and
processes.
The internal economic structure refers to the types of trans-
actional form that link channel members, ranging from market-based
exchanges to administered or hierarchical transaction methods.
Within these extremes are a variety of formal and informal
contractual arrangements.
Internal economic processes refer to the decision and control
mechanisms that are adopted within the chosen economic structure,
decisions with respect to pricing and other terms of exchange,
incentf.ve systems and the allocation of functions among dyad
members. Within market-based systems, terms of exchange are often
determined through competitive pricing, while hierarchical struc-
tures involve centralised administered decision making. In between
these structural extremes, contractual processes and bargaining are
often employed.
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Figure 2.1: Key Concepts in the Political Economy Framework
Such a framework allows many hypotheses to be tested with
respect to the efficiency and effectiveness of different decision
processes across a range of transactional structures, employing
modern economic concepts of market failure, agency theory, trans-
action costs and control losses. Indeed much of the previous work
of economists and industrial organisation scholars fits into this
format. A value of the political economy framework, however, is that
the analyst's attention will be turned to other variables in either
the internal polity, or the external environment, that might be
crucial to explaining observed performance and evolution within the
internal economic structure, and that may have been ignored in more
narrowly-focussed paradigms.
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Whereas the "economy" of the marketing channel allocates scarce
resources, the internal "polity" can be viewed as an allocation
system that allocates power and authority among channel members. As
with the internal economy, the internal polity can be broken down
into structural and process dimensions. The former refers to the
initial pattern of power-dependence relations within the channel,
and can range between the extremes of minimal power in perfectly-
competitive systems to completely centralised power. While in the
latter case the channel administrator is undisputed, the issue of
channel leader may not be clear, or may be a matter of dispute, in
intermediate cases. Or, different channel units may exercise some
degree of power and control over different marketing functions or
commodity flows. Also, the internal socio-political structure will
change through time as firms' power-bases undergo change, perhaps
in response to aspects of the external political economy or to re-
groupings of the social units that comprise the channel.
The internal socio-political processes refer to the dominant
sentiments (attitudes) and behaviour that characterise channel
member interactions, determined at least in part by the socio-
political structure. Potential behaviours include those along a
cooperation-conflict continuum, and actual behaviour will be
influenced by the way in which firms choose to use their power.
Relationships also exist between the internal economy and the
attitudes and behaviour of channel members, e.g. consider the
sentiments that may arise in centrally-administered channels versus
market-based structures. Also, a key behaviour variable in trans-
action cost economics is opportunism, defined as "self-interest
seeking with guile", examples of which are distortion of information
and failure to fulfil (contractual) promises. Such behaviour can
lead to situations of conflict, and the scope for opportunism may
vary between market exchange systems and administered or integrated
exchange structures.
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2.3 The External Political Economy
There would be little argument that external conditions play a
role in determining the evolution of marketing institutions. Agri-
cultural marketing boards arose, for example, in response to both
perceived power imbalances within existing channels (an internal
variable) and economic depression and instability in the channel's
external environment. Through time, the internal structures and
processes of such administered marketing channels have been modified
in response to other environmental variables, such as consumer
pressure groups, changes in governments I philosophies , competitor
behaviour and international trade barriers. However, explicit
study of the ways in which such external variables impact on the
structure, processes and performance appear to be lacking, in
agricultural marketing analyses as well as in more general marketing
research.
The external political economy framework is approached in
somewhat diff erent fashion from the internal framework, where a
classification scheme based on economic and political structures and
processes was adopted. Instead, the following three environments are
defined:
The Primary Task Environment, comprising the immediate
customers and suppliers of the focus dyad (or network of
dyads) ;
The Secondary Task Environment, comprising suppliers and
customers of the immediate suppliers and customers (i. e.
"one-off" relationships) and regulatory agents and interest
groups.
The Macro Environment, comprising sociopolitical, economic
and technological forces that influence the primary and
secondary task environments.
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Because the dyad or channel of interest enters into direct
exchange on a one-to-one basis with members of its primary task
environment and sometimes those of the Secondary Task Environment such
as regulatory agents, these relationships can be thought of in terms
of economic and political structures and processes (e.g. type of
exchange, power distribution and behavioural at titudes) as per the
internal framework. It may be less useful to identify economic and
political variables separately in the remaining environments, however,
because of the complex way in which such forces interact to influence
behaviour and performance. Hence definition of a manageable number of
higher order constructs will probably be necessary to capture such
environmental impacts.
The external political economy can be classified across the above
three environments in terms of the main sectors to which any channel
dyad must relate. These are:
the Input Sector, comprising all direct or indirect suppliers
to the focal dyad or channel;
the Output Sector, comprising all customers (direct and
indirect) of the focal dyad;
the Competitive Sector, comprising actual/potential
competitors of the channel dyad, and
the Regulatory Sector, comprising regulatory groups such as
government, and other pressure or interest groups.
When analysing interactions between the dyad or channel under
study and the primary environment, the internal political economy
framework is likely to be applicable. This is because such inter-
actions involve a direct exchange and can be classified according
to the transactional structure, decision processes, power distri-
bution, and cooperative or conflictual attitudes. Agents in the
competitive and regulatory environment can also be treated in the same
way provided that an exchange relationship with the focal dyad exists
15
(which need not be restricted to an exchange of goods and services for
money) .
As suggested above, relationships between the unit of study and
the secondary or macro environments are more diffuse since a direct
exchange does not take place. The analysis can proceed along at least
two alternative lines. The first involves detailed study of the
secondary environment agents and institutions, e.g. in terms of their
resources, power and influence, as well as the components of the
macro environment such as technological, economic and demographic
developments. Because of the immensity of such a task, a more
productive alternative is likely to involve attempts to characterise
the environment in terms of its abstract qualities or dimensions:
initial study and surveys of the channel environment could allow
construction of a list of specific environmental variables. These may
then be reduced to a set of quantitative variables that in a summary
way describe the major features of the environment, and which may be
useful in building and testing theories. For example, in one study the
external environment was represented by four variables - the product's
life cycle stage, uncertainty, marketing technology and interchannel
competition.
2.4 The Parallel Political Marketplace
The external political economy discussed in the previous section
included regulatory agents and interest groups. A deeper understanding
of the external environment may be obtained through closer scrutiny
of the exchange relationships between such agents and groups. These
exchanges are seen as taking place in a political marketplace that
operates in parallel to the distribution channel, since marketing
issues that activate transactions within the political market would
likely be accompanied by a dynamic series of exchange relationships
among marketing and political agents.
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The principal actors in the parallel political marketplace
include government and associated regulatory agents and authorities,
trade as sociations, unions, consumer groups and other interest and
welfare groups. Transactions between pairs of such groups typically
involve information and authority rather than goods and services but
all the same, market outcomes will depend upon structural linkages
among such agents, power and bargaining performance, and prevailing
cooperative or conflict sentiments. This would suggest that the
political marketplace could be studied in the same way as the physical
distribution channel.
It would appear that the implications of the existence of
parallel political marketplaces in agricultural marketing systems have
been either ignored in, or at least put to one side of, agricultural
marketing analyses. It is not difficult to grasp the significance of
such markets, however. Such political exchanges should not be ignored
in public policy analyses, since those exchanges determine to a
greater or lesser degree the shape of adopted public policies. An
improved understanding of the structure and decision processes within
the parallel political marketplace might also allow its response to
public policy changes to be forecast, so that this information could
in turn comprise a valuable input to the policy design process.
Individual marketing firms might also find such forecasts of value to
assist in formulating approaches to successfully implement changes to
their own marketing strategies or adoption of innovative practices
such as the introduction of cartoned milk or live sheep exports, or
supply manipulation by marketing boards.
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2.5 Progress in the Empirical Application
of this Framework
The empirical studies reported in the marketing literature reveal
a heavy emphasis on behavioural and socio-poli tical relationships,
especially among power and its sources, intra-channel conflict and its
relation to the use of power. The approach has been heavily oriented
to micro-managerial issues such as how a firm should use its power,
exert leadership and control, and manage conflict. It should also be
said that this literature generally approaches the issue of control
from the point of view of increasing the performance of the control-
ling agent with little if any discussion of the implications for
total system performance. Less common are studies that explore the
interaction among the socio-political and economic variables, or
between channel relationships and its external environment, that take
a macro approach to channel organisation and management, or that
explore linkages between the political economy variables and firm or
channel performance.
While the literature appears to accept as axiomatic that total
channel performance can be improved through better coordination of
specific tasks, little evidence is presented. Further, while improved
coordination may lead to improved levels of performance and channel
member satisfaction, the process of coordination implies that at
least some members give up a degree of autonomy that might in turn be
expected to lead to dissatisfaction on their part. However, little
empirical evidence was found to support the contention that the use of
power can increase coordination of activities. Little attention has
also been paid to the factors likely to encourage the development of
cooperative attitudes and their impact on improved coordination.
Calls to achieve higher levels of coordination in marketing
channels are often accompanied by an inability to define the
activities that might be better coordinated, how to achieve that
18
result, and expected benefits. Since total system performance, as well
as that of individual channel agents, may be more sensitive to some
channel variables than others, a useful research focus could be the
identification of such critical variables, to assist in the design of
cost-effective control and coordination strategies.
2.6 Conclusion
This review has indicated that the combination of the internal
and external political economy models establishes an integrative
framework for market channel analysis. Examination of this framework
will raise issues in channel structure, management and performance,
and should give researchers an improved and wider insight into the
critical dimensions, relationships and variables of the system to be
studied.
It provides a framework that encompasses but goes beyond the
paradigms of economics, on which models may be designed to evaluate
propositions in relation to many important issues in agricultural and
horticultural marketing.
* * * * *
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Chapter 3
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
3.1 Introduction
Insights which newer economic theories might offer on the
evolution and efficiency of marketing channels will now be investi-
gated. In Chapter 1, the more detailed examination of these broad
research issues established that a focus on the micro-environment in
which individual channel participants operated was appropriate.
With this perspective and these issues in mind, recent research
which focusses on the economic nature of contractual arrangements
which are formed has been assessed. In particular, the implications
of positive transaction costs (in a broadly defined sense) for
contractual arrangements has been explored. An investigation of
these theoretical concepts seemed appropriate, since they have been
used to examine issues similar to those of why marketing channels
might evolve, and whether resulting structures are efficient.
3.2 Factors Influencing Contractual Arrangements
This recent research focusses on contrac tual choices as the
unit of analysis. That is, the relationship between a principal and
his or her agent comes under scrutiny, and analytical emphasis is at
the contractual level. Such a focus potentially allows a wide range
20
of such relationships to be investigated, both within and between
firms. It must be noted, however, that contract s of this nature
refer to any economic or social interaction between entities and
individuals, rather than to the standard legal definition implied by
this term.
It seems reasonable to assume that agents which enter into
any contractual arrangement do so in order to increase the level
of their utilities. This may imply that there are cost savings
associated with forming such relat ionships. A common hypothesis
advanced in the literature is that specific contractual arrangements
emerge in order to minimise transaction costs faced by the prin-
cipal. However, care must be exercised when utilising transaction
costs concepts as a theoretical device since an investigation of the
literature on this topic reveals that the concept has been defined
in a range of ways, some of which are quite specific, whereas others
are more all-encompassing.
For the purposes of this study, a relatively broad definition
of transaction costs is adopted. In the first instance, transaction
costs may be defined as the costs associated with discovering
prices. In order to avoid part of these costs, a principal may enter
into a contractual arrangement with an agent. However, while saving
some transaction costs, this act in itself induces a further subset
of these costs known as agency costs. Broadly speaking, these are
costs associated with the contractual arrangement, and an important
component of these costs is that element which is associated
with ensuring that the agent behaves in the principal's interest,
including any expenditure necessary to monitor agent performance.
In general, the nature of any contractual arrangement is
influenced by a variety of factors. For a given set of risk prefer-
ences and an existing allocation of property rights, such factors
include the nature and distribution of information imperfections,
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which largely determines risk perceptions, and the aforementioned
costs associated with the agency relationship, which are determined
by a number of factors which will be outlined below.
Consider the influence of risk on the type of contractual
arrangement which emerges. There are two elements of risk fac ing
contracting parties. The first type may be referred to as natural
risk. This may be composed of exogenous supply-side elements, as
occurs in many agricultural industries, or it may be associated with
demand, or with both aspects. When such risk is demand related, the
distribution of information may be such that asymmetries exist. That
is, demand conditions may be more obvious to some parties than to
others, and this may influence the nature of any contractual
arrangement.
An equally important component of risk is the agency problem
referred to previously. That is, there are costs associated with
ensuring that the agent's behaviour coincides as closely as possible
with the principal's best interests. This type of risk, and there-
fore these types of costs, are likely to be higher under certain
types of contractual arrangement.
In general, they will be higher when no mechanism exists to
discipline the contractual arrangement, or when it is difficult
to monitor agent performance. An example of the first factor
would occur when a principal did not appear to have the option of
operating through another agent in a similar contractual arrange-
ment, or through another channel which offers an alternative type of
contract. Turning to the second point, monitoring difficulties may
occur when the measures of performance of alternative contractual
options are not independent. In summary, agency costs will be higher
when contractual options, or in a broader sense, marketing channels,
are not effectively contestable.
22
When analysing the nature of different contracts, it may also
prove useful to focus on the functions which these contracts seek to
perform. In general contracts appear to signal characteristics, to
provide performance incentives to the agent in a relationship, and
to allocate risk between both of the contracting parties. Given
information on the likely response to incentives by the agent and
the risk preferences of both parties, this approach allows some
judgement to be made on whether the arrangement is optimal in some
sense, and hence, mutually beneficial to both parties.
The above discussion illustrates that this focus on the nature
of contracts will provide some insights into why specific contrac-
tual arrangements, and ultimately marketing structures, emerge. It
also indicates whether such arrangements are likely to be efficient
in the sense that costs are minimised through the freedom of entry
into, and exit from, these arrangements.
3.3 Applications to Agricultural Marketing Channels
In this section, the relationship between specific contractual
arrangements and some of the factors discussed above will be
examined. It must be stressed that this hypothesizing is somewhat
casual, and ideally, should be subject to much more rigorous
empirical scrutiny. However, the objective of this section is to
illustrate how the above economic concepts may assist in evaluating
market structures.
3.3.1 Natural risk
Consider the implications of different levels and distributions
of natural risk. Take an industry which started as a result of an
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exporter's effort in securing a market. This exporter would then
seek product with which to supply the market. However, if the
product was unknown to producers, then the exporter may have to
offer forward contracts to induce the supplier to produce the crop.
In this way, the exporter bears the price risk, while the supplier
bears the risk associated with an unfamiliar product.
Contrast this situation with that where supply is production
driven rather than market driven. In this case, the supplier has
product available, and requires an agent to find a market for this
output. However, the agent may be unwilling to bear the price risk
associated with a product whose market potential is unknown. There-
fore, the producer may have to relieve the agent of this potential
price risk by contracting a commission selling arrangement.
These two examples illustra te how different contractual
arrangements may arise in seemingly similar circumstances. In the
first case, natural risk was greater on the supply side, thereby
leading to a contractual arrangement where the exporter bears the
price risk. In the second situation, such risk is concentrated on
the demand side, in which case the producer may accept the price
risk.
Further consideration of the balance of this risk over time
may also lead to insights into why contractual arrangements in
an industry change. Consider the linseed example. In this case,
the stimulus appeared to come from exporters who perceived export
opportunities for the product. They offered producers forward
contracts as an inducement to grow an unfamiliar crop. However, the
exporters were unable to realise these forward prices which they
had offered. As a consequence, they declined to offer such contracts
in the following season. However, growers by that time were more
familiar with the crop's cultural requirements and asked exporters
to operate on their behalf as commission agents in export markets.
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Initially, risk by both parties was perceived to be greater
at the supply end, which may have led to forward contracts being
offered. However, as growers became more established, but markets
appeared more uncertain, this balance of risk changed, which may
have caused a change in the contractual selling arrangement. Hence,
contractual options may have "flip-flopped" as a result of changing
risk perceptions in growing and marketing the product.
The nature of this type of risk might also explain why similar
channel options appear to occur in some industries. For example,
where demand risk is seen to be greater, all agents may wish to
offer a commission selling arrangement, and compete with each other
at the margin. In this case, forward or fixed pricing agreements
might not emerge.
3.3.2 Agency considerations
Consider the evolution of marketing channels in the context of
agency relationships. In the barley industry, companies initially
offered growers a fixed price for their product. However, these
prices appeared to get out of line with the world product price,
thereby creating an agency problem for producers. A group of growers
responded by setting up their own cooperative which sold on commis-
sion and returned growers a pool price.
It is of interest to note that the companies apparently raised
their price to suppliers in response to the threat of producer
coordination, and eventually switched to operating pooling arrange-
ments as well. In this case, it proved relatively easy for producers
to monitor company performance, and to force down agency costs
associated with the relationship by opening up an alternative
marketing option.
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However, it is possible to envisage situations in which
channels are difficult to contest. Take the behaviour of exporters
in the meat industry prior to 1982. When schedule prices were set
in this industry, they tended to reflect current market conditions.
However, it can be argued that the commission agents may have been
indulging in so-called weak pricing, since this type of contractual
arrangement presented them with no incentive to enhance prices at
the point of sale. Therefore, weak prices would suggest unfavourable
market conditions, which would then be reflected in the schedule
price. Hence, this schedule price would not provide a competitive
check against commission selling, since it was dependent, to an
extent, on the price of product sold on commission.
Therefore, unlike the barley example noted above, in this case
it might not have been possible to efficiently monitor channel
performance relative to alterna tive marketing channels, and hence
the extent of any agency problems might not be perceived, which
would be an inhibition to channel switching or opening up a new
channel.
3.4 Conclusions
The economic theory which has been investigated suggests that
a focus on incentives, risk and information might prove valuable
when investigating the nature of contractual arrangements, marketing
structures, and their relative performance.
For example, this type of analysis could indicate the extent to
which an agent is likely to behave in a principal's interest, how
risk is allocated, and whether transaction costs in their various
manifestations are likely to be minimised. On the basis of these
observations, comment could be made on the relative efficiency of
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alternative marketing channels, which would give an indication of
whether government should intervene or withdraw from activity in
these channels.
When applied in a positive sense, this type of analysis may be
useful in determining why alternative contractual arrangements exist
in different industries, and why such arrangements may be different
in the same industry at different periods in time. It may also
assist in explaining why specific contractual forms predominate in
certain situations.
It must be noted that the various con·tractual arrangements
which would be assessed could operate in unregulated markets or
within statutorily controlled channels. Therefore, rather than
considering the relative merits of statutory versus non-statutory
marketing structures, an application of these concepts would
emphasise incentive structures and contestability at various stages
of a marketing channel, regardless of its legal status. This type
of analysis may also indicate appropriate behaviour for government
agencies. When regulatory barriers to entry exist which limit the
contestability of marketing channels, then government may be advised
to remove such barriers. Similarly, when government policies obscure
the ability of producers to monitor agent behaviour, then such
policies may need to be reassessed. On the other hand, when it
is difficult to monitor channel performance because performance
measures are not independent, then Government may need to evaluate
pricing procedures, and transmit information on relative efficiency
to producers.
* * * * *
27
Chapter 4
A WIDER PERSPECTIVE ON MARKETING ISSUES
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, two approaches to the analysis
of marketing channel issues were evaluated. The first of these
emanated from the marketing literature, whereas the second had its
origins in newer microeconomic interpretations of contractual
behaviour. An attempt will now be made to integrate insights from
both of these approaches, and to consider the implications of the
resulting perspective for marketing channel analysis.
Recall that the primary concern of this paper is with marketing
channel performance and any resulting implications of this for
government behaviour. It must be noted however, that these perfor-
mance issues are often expressed in terms of perceived problems,
such as weak selling behaviour, the lack of marketing or promotional
activity, insufficient innovation, or exploitation of individual
channel members. In addition, it was determined that an investiga-
tion into why alternative marketing channels arise or coexist might
prove useful, since this would deepen the understanding of these
systems, and highlight factors which influence their performance.
The examination of the marketing literature concluded that
attempts to study the behaviour of participants in a marketing
channel will be enhanced by examining a wider range of both internal
and environmental factors than those traditionally considered in
conventional neo-classical economic analysis. That is, a wider
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political economy approach to analysing marketing channels is
appropriate where factors which influence both the economic or
competitive environment and the political or regulatory environment
are taken into account, as well as the politics and sociology of
interactions among channel members. Relationships considered in this
context may be either horizontal or vertical.
Much of the quantitative literature in the marketing area
tends to identify internal polity variables which are associated
with specific channel characteristics. However, the theoretical
mechanism which drives much of this observed behaviour is often
poorly defined. While the underlying motivations of individual
channel members are not always made explicit, actual decision making
behaviour is described and the wider perspective envisaged by this
approach is insightful.
On the other hand, the economic theory of contractual behaviour
which has been evaluated makes the objectives of the two parties in
a relationship quite obvious by the focus on incentive structures
and the allocation of risk. In this way, a normative link between
behaviour and performance is established through Pareto-efficiency
concepts.
These studies tend to have a somewhat narrow economic focus in
that they are most appropriate when analysing why economic forms of
interaction occur between two parties. In an unmodified form, they
are likely to be of limited usefulness when attempting to explain
why different types of horizontal associations emerge among channel
members, and between channel members and regulatory agencies.
There would seem to be two ways in which the contributions
of these two strands of literature to marketing channel analysis
could be integrated. First, the economic concepts analysed in the
contractual choice literature could be viewed as a specific subset
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of the wider political-economy framework. In this case, the focus
is on the internal economy variables, and a behavioural mechanism
which links these variables by utilising transaction costs concepts
has been identified, although other variables within the political
economy framework might usefully explain variations in such
behaviour.
Second, the analysis of marketing channel issues may be
enhanced by attempting to apply some of these economic concepts to
the internal polity variables considered crucial in the marketing
literature. That is, it could be considered whether the theory of
contractual choice as applied to the internal polity yields insights
into behaviour within this realm additional to those which stern
from the power-dependence types of study traditionally utilised to
describe socio-political behaviour between channel members. This
possibiltiy will now be investigated by focussing on some of the
linkages which may occur between channel members.
4.2 Types of Interaction
It is the nature of these linkages or interactions between
firms which determines the institutional structure of an industry
and its associated marketing channels. A variety of interactions
between marketing channel participants can be postulated, and it is
evident that changes in the types of interaction which exist between
participants will alter the structure of the marketing channel.
Consider how such changes might occur.
In the first instance, interac tions between individual firms
may change. One of the most obvious structural changes which would
occur would be integration of either a horizontal or vertical type,
where a single firm assumes responsibility for the activities which
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may have been carried out by separate firms. However, more subtle
structural changes may occur. For example, partial control of
another firm's behaviour may be exercised through share purchases.
Alternatively contractual arrangements between business entities may
involve more than simple market transactions and the exchange of
goods. For example, firms may participate in marketing agreements
which involve joint decision making, or develop complex franchising
arrangements.
In addition to these linkages, less obvious forms of inter-
action between firms might occur. For example, associations of
individuals or firms may be created. Such associations may not
seek to maximise their own profits but exist for the benefit of
their members. Examples of this type of association could include
coopera tives, j oint marketing agreement s, trade associations,
producer boards, or political groups such as Federated Farmers.
Membership of such associations may be voluntary, or may be
compulsory. In the latter case, statutory authority may have been
invoked to avoid free rider problems.
The above arrangements highlight the sophisticated nature of
many of the transactions which may occur between individuals or
institutions. Obviously, some of these linkages involve primarily
economic relationships, whereas others involve socio-political
processes. In addition, they may occur vertically between channel
members or horizontally, with these latter linkages reaching into
the economic or competitive environment or into the external
political or regulatory environment. These linkages might be defined
as sophisticated contracts which describe the relationships between
firms. They are obviously not explicit or legal contracts in all
cases, but they are assumed to describe the total relationship
between any pair of firms or organisations. Thus they incorporate
both economic and non-economic elements.
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4.3 Regulatory Linkages
Of particular interest are linkages which exist between firms
and government. One reason why individuals and institutions interact
with regulatory agencies might be to seek the imposition of regula-
tions which could benefit them or their members. This may be done by
forming a lobby or pressure group for this purpose. Although it is
possible for a single individual or firm to become involved in such
activity, the transaction costs of doing so may be prohibitively
expensive, and such costs might be reduced and minimised by
association with a group.
It is important to note, however, that not all associations
indulge in the above rent-seeking type of behaviour. For example,
cooperatives, stabilisation boards and information gathering
associa tions may seek to benefit their members through different
activities aimed at stabilising incomes or reducing costs in one
form or another. On the other hand, rent-seeking activity is
typically aimed at reallocating benefits between groups in an
economy through mechanisms such as tariffs or licensing agreements.
In any interaction between marketing channel participants and
the regulatory environment which involves rent-seeking, particular
channel members typically seek to interact with regulatory agencies.
However, other forms of interaction could occur where interaction
with channel participants is initiated by the regulatory body. This
could occur when they seek to influence behaviour in the marketing
channel to correct instances of market failure. It is generally
accepted that market failures are associated with externalities and
common property rights.
Defining market failures has proved to be a tenuous pastime,
and in this study, the rationale for, and consequences of, this
type of intervention in the marketing channel will not be considered
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in any detail. However, it is worth noting that some interaction
between firms may occur in a manner similar to rent-seeking, where
individuals or groups attempt to persuade the government to
intervene to correct a market failure. An example of this could
occur where producer groups seek government assistance for market
research, using common property arguments. However, it may prove
difficult to assess whether any particular request is rent-seeking
or a genuine attempt to correct market failure.
The above discus sion has identif ied, in very general terms,
some of the ways in which channel participants interact with each
other. Obviously, such linkages are much wider and more complex
than those typified by the standard neo-classical economic model
of behaviour in a perfec tly competi ti ve environment, where all
contracts are assumed to be in the form of simple exchanges.
4.4 Benefits of Association
The frameworks analysed in earlier chapters provide analytical
tools which might be used to evaluate some of these more complex
interactions. Their features may be defined by a political economy
paradigm where power structures are specifically described. In
addition, careful observation of the contractual arrangements which
exist could give an indication of performance incentives, the
allocation of risk and the distribution of power within a channel.
These features have obvious implications for the level of conflict
in a channel, and ultimately, for channel performance.
When evaluating such arrangements, a useful starting point
might be to consider the mutual benefits which accrue to individual
parties from this association. This approach may allow the power-
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dependence structure associated with any interaction to be more
clearly defined.
It is important to examine both the level and the distribution
of the mutual benefits to an association. Consider a situation where
both parties to a contract have alternative options, such as might
occur in any standard market exchange. In this case, it might be
argued that the mutual benefits from the interaction are evenly
spread, the power-dependence structure is relatively balanced
between parties, and levels of conf lict are minimal. However,
because of the ability of both parties to walk away from this
arrangement, the mutual benefit s from this particular interaction
are low.
Alternatively, consider the case where a supplier has product
available, and requires an agent to find a market for this output.
The opportunity cost to the producer of not entering into such an
arrangement will be relatively high, whereas it may be quite low for
the exporter, since it may represent a low proportion of his or her
total business. Therefore, the perceived benefits of association are
greater for the producer, making him or her more dependent on the
exporter. This relatively powerful position may allow the exporter
to define contractual conditions which appear to disadvantage the
producer. For example, exporters may agree to act as commission
agents, thereby allowing the producer to bear the entire price risk
associated with the transaction. Similar examples may be envisaged
with franchinsor-franchisee relationships or between manufacturers
and retailers. In these cases, the power-dependence structure may
appear to be unbalanced. Despite this, such arrangements may be
relatively stable, conflict may be low, and the level of mutual
benefits from the association may be high.
Up to this point, the term "mutual benefits" has been used to
loosely describe the advantages to any association. In addition to
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saving transaction costs in the vertical dimension, which has been
explored previously, these advantages may incorporate a wide range
of cost-reducing or revenue-enhancing activity in both the
horizontal and vertical dimensions. In essence, these "mutual
benefits" encompass all those advantages to an association which are
not captured by a simple market exchange. Obviously it could be
argued that where there are no mutual benefits to association beyond
a simple exchange, then only that kind of market transaction will
occur.
In general, interactions between firms, or between firms and
associations or even between associations, can loosely be described
as contracts which are willingly entered into in the search for
mutual benefits. In some respects, such contracts can be viewed as
a partial integration between two parties, the strength of which
depends on the size and distribution of the mutual benefits which
arise from the arrangement.
Consider alternative types of arrangement into which a producer
might enter, and the benefits which will accrue to him or her from
this. In the first instance, a producer may enter into a cooperative
arrangement with respect to the supply of inputs, thereby reducing
production costs through economies of scale. On the output side, a
forward contract may be set up with a purchasing agent, the advan-
tages of which are trans~ction costs savings through risk spreading.
Other forms of contract could, of course, be considered in this
vein. In a horizontal dimension, producer marketing associations
could be entered. Such organisations may undertake activities such
as generic promotion on behalf of producer members who benefit by
saving transaction costs which would be incurred when undertaking
the promotion individually, and by overcoming corresponding free
rider problems. A producer might also enter into some type of
political association where benefits accrue from rent-seeking
behaviour.
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Each of the above contracts will have a set of characteristics.
For example, performance incentive structures will be determined,
risk will be allocated, allocative signals emitted, and power-
dependence relationships established. Obviously, some if not all of
these characteristics are interdependent. Whether such arrangements
are stable will depend upon other aspects, such as actual perfor-
mance of both parties, their tolerance towards the dependence
relationship, and their satisfaction with the outcomes of the
association.
In summary, when analysing marketing arrangements, it may prove
useful to focus on these contractual features using the concepts
outlined in previous sections. This should give an indication of how
structures evolve, whether they are efficient, and why they respond
in a particular manner to changes in the environment facing them.
4.5 An Example
An example that makes use of some of these concepts within
the wider political-economy framework will now be outlined. Consider
why the attitudes of meat exporters to market development have
apparently changed in recent years with far greater effort being
exerted in this direction.
During the period of Meat Board control, the major source of
revenue for meat exporting companies was from commission sales of
meat on behalf of the Board, which offered licensing arrangements
to specific companies. Obviously, economic rents were associated
with these licences and companies had an incentive to acquire this
privilege.
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The Meat Board was of the opinion that greater product develop-
ment was desirable for the industry, and implied that it was more
likely to award marketing privileges to firms that held the same
opinion. This desire for a change in marketing emphasis by the Board
appeared to induce a change in attitudes in this respect by the
exporting companies.
Consider this association between the Board and each of the
exporters. The Meat Board had considerable power over the companies
through its control of the export licensing procedure. Conversely,
the companies were dependent on the Board. To this extent, the power
structure was unbalanced and the mutual benefits were perceived to
be high. With the unstable nature of the situation, a high degree
of conflict appeared to manifest itself within the channel. Through
its change in policy, the Board effectively altered the incentive
structures facing the exporting companies. It was not surprising,
therefore, that the companies suddenly "saw the light" with respect
to marketing activity!
4.6 Implications for Policy Analysis
A number of implications for policy analysis emerge from this
study. First, when considering behaviour in the marketing channel,
the framework that could be most profitably adopted is much wider
than that implied by more narrow economic criteria. Further, in
addition to considering vertical associations between entities, it
would be useful to focus on horizontal associations between these
entities, and on their associations with regulatory agencies.
Second, the focus of such analysis at the "contractual" level,
highlighting the nature of the interaction between each pair of
firms, would yield useful insights into why particular structures
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emerge, and whether their pe rf ormance is sa tisfac tory. This
"contractual" analysis stresses the motivations of individual
channel participants, and considers the sources and distribution of
power, incentive structures, the distribution of risk and allocative
signals, and the resultant behaviour of those participants.
Third, examination of the nature and characteristics of the
contractual relationships among channel members across different
marketing channels is one way of putting propositions to the test.
Because of the large number of variables within the wider political
economy framework, propositions will probably have to be rather
narrowly focussed, and candidate channels for the comparative
analysis carefully chosen if the relationships to be explored are
not to be masked by uncontrolled variation in other variables.
Selection of systems for comparison from similar cultures, product
types and time periods, for example, may ensure that many variables
are constant across these systems.
This type of analysis also yields insights for regulatory
agencies. When assessing the performance of a privately functioning
marketing channel, such agencies must assess whether these channels
are contestable. Contractual-level analysis should make this
explicit, since both natural and regulatory barriers to entry or
exit should become obvious. In addition, it would be possible to
assess whether agency costs can be minimised by an appropriate
monitoring of channel performance. Where the analysis indicates
that channels are not contestable, then such agencies must consider
whether and how to intervene in the channel.
The wider focus on various associations at a contractual level
should also allow regulatory institutions to analyse rent-seeking
behaviour in an appropriate manner. It suggests that requests for
intervention on the grounds of market failure should be carefully
evaluated within the above framework to determine whether they are
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genuine or whether they are rent-seeking attempts. In this way,
it would also be possible to isolate the relative distribution of
benefits from regulatory activity.
* * * * *
